The gold standard was a key factor behind the Great Depression, but why did it produce such an intense worldwide deflation and associated economic contraction? While the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 1928 is often blamed for having initiated the downturn, France increased its share of world gold reserves from 7 percent to 27 percent between 1927 and 1932 and effectively sterilized most of this accumulation. This "gold hoarding" created an artificial shortage of reserves and put other countries under enormous deflationary pressure. Counterfactual simulations indicate that world prices would have increased slightly between 1929 and 1933, instead of declining calamitously, if the historical relationship between world gold reserves and world prices had continued. The results indicate that France was somewhat more to blame than the United States for the worldwide deflation of 1929-33. The deflation could have been avoided if central banks had simply maintained their 1928 cover ratios.
Introduction
A large body of economic research has linked the gold standard to the length and severity of the Great Depression of the 1930s. 1 The gold standard's fixed-exchange rate regime transmitted financial disturbances across countries and prevented the use of monetary policy to address the economic crisis. This conclusion is supported by two compelling observations:
countries not on the gold standard managed to avoid the Great Depression almost entirely, while countries on the gold standard did not begin to recover until after they left it.
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While the link between the gold standard and the Great Depression is widely accepted, it begs the question of how the international monetary system produced such a monumental economic catastrophe. Structural flaws in the post-World War I gold standard and the fragility of international financial stability are often blamed for the problems of the period. However, it is not clear why such factors should have necessarily led to the massive price deflation experienced between 1929 and 1933 and the enormous economic difficulties that followed. In particular, there was no apparent shortage of gold in the 1920s and 1930s -worldwide gold reserves continued to expand -so it is not obvious why the system self-destructed and produced such a cataclysm.
To explain the disaster, contemporary observers and economic historians have pointed to the policies followed by central banks. The standard explanation for the onset of the Great Depression is the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in early 1928 (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Hamilton 1987) . The increase in U.S. interest rates attracted gold from the rest of the world, but the gold inflows were sterilized by the Federal Reserve so that they did not affect the monetary base. This forced other countries to tighten their monetary policies as well, without the benefit of a monetary expansion in the United States. From this initial deflationary impulse came currency crises and banking panics that merely reinforced the downward spiral of prices.
In the view of many economists, the United States deserves blame for starting the vicious cycle. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 360) argue that "the United States was in the van of the movement and not a follower." 3 Similarly, Eichengreen (1992, 222) states that "events in America were directly responsible for the slowdown in other parts of the world."
However, what often frequently overlooked -or mentioned only in passing -is the fact that France was doing almost exactly the same thing. In fact, France was accumulating and sterilizing gold reserves at a much more rapid rate than the United States. Contemporary observers then and scholars of the Great Depression today have been aware of this fact, but it still remains a relatively neglected factor whose importance has not been fully appreciated.
Some scholars of French monetary history have even concluded that France deserves more blame than the United States for the world's increasing monetary stringency in the late 3 "The international effects were severe and the transmission rapid, not only because the gold-exchange standard had rendered the international financial system more vulnerable to disturbances, but also because the United States did not follow gold-standard rules, " Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 361) note. "We did not permit the inflow of gold to expand the U.S. money stock. We not only sterilized it, we went much further. Our money stock moved perversely, going down as the gold stock went up. . . . The result was that other countries not only had to bear the whole burden of adjustment but also were faced with continued additional disturbances in the same direction, to which they had to adjust." 1920s and early 1930s. Johnson (1997, 147) Great Depression and wrote that France also deserved some responsibility for its occurrence.
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Unfortunately, there is almost no quantitative evidence on the relative strength of deflationary forces emanating from the United States and France due to the withdrawal of gold from the rest of the world. Eichengreen (1990) finds that U.S. monetary gold stocks were three times and French gold stocks nearly five times that predicted based on estimated central-bank reserve demand from a cross section of countries. If the U.S. and French shares had been at their predicted levels, the gold reserves of other countries could have doubled and, "assuming that central banks were concerned to retain some proportion between their reserves and domestic liabilities," Eichengreen concludes, "this redistribution of reserves would have provided considerable scope for an expansion of money supplies." Sumner (1991) uses a monetary identity to decompose the underlying factors behind the changes in the world price level and finds that central bank demand for monetary gold had a major impact on prices between 1926 and 1932. Although he does not focus on France in particular or use estimated relationships and counterfactual analysis, as employed here, his conclusions are consistent with this paper's findings and will be discussed below. Bernanke and Mihov (2000) also decompose national price movements due to changes in the money supply to components such as changes in the money multiplier, cover ratios, reserve to gold ratios, and the stock of gold. beginning the worldwide deflationary spiral.
6 As Temin (1989, 22) writes: "American gold holdings were larger than those of the French, and the American influence on events was larger."
The Controversy about France's Monetary Policy, 1928-1932
Many of the international monetary difficulties of the late 1920s can be traced to the decisions made to resume the gold standard in the mid-1920s after World War I. The Genoa conference of 1922 established guidelines (unenforceable ones, however) for the reconstructed gold standard. One concern at the time was that there would be insufficient new gold production to keep up with the growing demand for gold, thereby producing deflation. Because the nominal price of gold was fixed in terms of national currencies, a decrease in the supply of gold would manifest itself not in a higher price of gold, but in a lower price of all other commodities.
Sweden's Gustav Cassel was the leading economist who warned of an impending shortage of gold and the possibility of worldwide price deflation. Based on historical experience, he concluded that the world stock of monetary gold had to increase by about three percent a year to keep up with commercial activity and the growing demand for gold and thereby maintain the existing level of world prices. If the monetary gold stock grew more than 3 percent, world prices would increase; if the monetary gold stock grew less than 3 percent, world prices would fall. 7 Cassel and others believed that world gold production was slowing and that this was a cause for concern because of the problems associated with deflation. He also thought that there would be higher demand for gold after the war because central banks had to support a larger base of liabilities due to the inflation that occurred during the war when the gold standard was suspended. The wartime inflation meant that nominal liabilities could not be covered by the existing monetary base of gold, so countries would either have to reset their exchange rate parities or accumulate more gold reserves. Fearful of the deflationary consequences of many central banks seeking to acquire more gold reserves at the same time, Cassel advocated a "gold-exchange" standard in which foreign exchange holdings could also be used as central bank reserves to augment gold and thereby ensure stable prices. 8 The Genoa conference endorsed the view that central banks should economize on the use of gold by using foreign exchange as part of their reserve base. Resolution No. 9 of the Conference recommended that central banks "centralise and coordinate the demand for gold, and so avoid those wide fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold which might otherwise result from the simultaneous and competitive efforts of a number of countries to secure metallic reserves." However, the Genoa resolutions were simply guidelines that could not be enforced.
There was no agreement at all on the "rules" of gold standard game, particularly the idea that countries with increasing gold reserves should inflate their money supplies. In addition, many countries, France foremost among them, were skeptical of using foreign exchange reserves (such as British pounds) as part of its reserve base, fearing that such a policy would be inflationary.
The reconstructed gold standard started off on the wrong foot in 1925 when Britain rejoined it at an exchange rate that overvalued the pound (Moggridge 1969) . This not only harmed the competitive position of export industries, but meant that the British balance of payments would remain in a fragile state until the country left gold in 1931. The balance of payments weakness required the Bank of England to maintain a tight monetary policy to sustain the pound at its high level, keeping interest rates high and thereby diminishing domestic investment. This kept economic growth in check and made it difficult for Britain to reduce its already high level of unemployment.
These problems were compounded in 1926 when France, after enduring a traumatic bout of inflation in 1924-26, stabilized the franc at an undervalued rate (Sicsic 1992 One of the main worries expressed by Cassel and acknowledged at the Genoa conference was that there would be a shortage of gold and deflation if new production of gold was insufficient to meet the growing demand for it. As it happened, the forecasts of declining gold production were off the mark. As Figure 1 shows, the supply of gold reserves continued to grow through the late 1920s and into the 1930s. In fact, world gold reserves increased 19 percent between 1928 and 1933. Hence, the fears of a gold shortage due to problems on the supply side failed to materialize.
9 As Mouré (2002, 188-89) notes: "The attitude of the Bank of France exemplified the asymmetry and the deflationary bias of the gold standard. The bank rejected the gold exchange standard as a dilution of the gold standard that promoted an over-expansion of credit . . . The Bank of France set itself resolutely against measures to increase domestic monetary circulation and prices."
10 At the time, the gold cover ratio was 40 percent, or 63 percent with foreign exchange reserves (Mouré 1991, 47-48) . It was understood that 40 percent was considered to be the minimum cover ratio so that the 35 percent would not be approached. Source: Hardy (1936, 92) .
What changed dramatically, however, was the international distribution of those reserves.
Partly as a result of the undervaluation of the franc, the Bank of France began accumulate gold reserves at a rapid rate. As 1913 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 percent of world stock
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Source: Hardy (1936, 93) France's stabilization in 1926 and America's tightening of monetary policy in 1928 combined to attract gold to these two countries at the expense of the rest of the world. Table 1 provides another look at the change in gold reserves during this period. In December 1928, world gold reserves were 5 percent larger than they had been in December 1927; France The sterilization is implicit in the cover ratios presented in Figure 3 . The cover ratio is the ratio of central bank gold reserves to its domestic liabilities (notes in circulation and demand deposits). Once again, the change in France stands out in comparison to the other countries. As noted earlier, the cover ratio of the Bank of France was mandated by the Monetary Law of 1928
to be a minimum of 35 percent, although the Bank wanted a minimum of 40 percent in practice.
This is about where the cover ratio was in December 1928. Of course, this was a mandatory lower bound and there was no maximum cover ratio beyond which the Bank was forbidden to go. By 1930, the Bank of France cover ratio rose to over 50 percent. In January 1931 it reached 55 percent; at this point the Bank of France considered but rejected a proposal to suspend its gold purchases (Mouré 2002, 188) . By 1932, the cover ratio had risen to the amazing level of nearly 80 percent! France was well on its way to having 100 percent base money, in which all of the central bank liabilities were backed one-for-one with gold in its vault.
The path of the U.S. cover ratio is also consistent with the previous discussion. Rist (1931) insisted that they were doing nothing to encourage the gold movement and argued that the inflows represented confidence in their economic policies. Sicsic (1993) notes that the capital inflows arose from the repatriation of capital by French residents after the stabilization became credible. Yet as Mouré (2002, 187) points out, this still created problems for the international financial system because even if all the gold coming back was repatriated capital, it had left the country without producing any decline in French gold reserves while it returned to France by delivering gold from the rest of the world.
And yet French policy was largely responsible for the massive gold inflows. The franc was deliberately undervalued in 1926 to encourage balance of payments surpluses and rising gold reserves. In addition, the Bank of France refused to consider foreign exchange as part of its asset base. The Bank promoted the accumulation of gold reserves by selling off its foreign exchange holdings and purchasing gold. By liquidating its holdings of British pounds, France put pressure on the Bank of England's gold reserves and hence on British monetary policy.
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A closer look at the balance sheet of the Bank of France indicates that it was not sterilizing in the classic sense of reducing domestic assets to offset the increase in foreign assets.
As Table 2 indicates, the Bank continued to accumulate domestic assets even as its foreign asset holdings grew. The Bank's total assets grew 29 percent between 1928 and 1932, although this understates the growth because the Bank did not treat foreign exchange as part of its monetary base; total assets of gold and domestic assets grew 102 percent. Patat and Lutfalla (1990) , Table A2 .
And yet, despite this growth in the monetary base, the money supply was essentially unchanged over this period. The implicit money multiplier dropped and offset the increase in high powered money. Figure 4 presents another depiction of France's reserves of gold, gold and foreign exchange, and money supply (M2). Simply put, the growth in the Bank's total assets was not getting translated into the nation's money and credit. Once again, French officials disclaimed responsibility. Finance Minister Paul Reynaud (1933, 258) pointed out that new francs had been issued in almost equal value to the amount of gold accumulated between 1928
and 1932 "as is required by the gold standard system." (Reynaud failed to note that a decline in commercial banks deposits had largely offset the increase in note issue.) Source: Patat and Lutfalla (1990 , Table A2 ) and Mouré (1991, 55-56) .
To some extent, the falling money multiplier was beyond the direct control of the Bank of France. 13 Eichengreen (1986) Bernanke and Mihov (2000, 139-40, 148-150) note that "the falling money multiplier combined with the Bank of France's movement from foreign exchange reserves to gold accounts for essentially the entire nullification of the effect of the gold inflows on the domestic money supply. . . given the French commitment to the gold standard,, and to exclusive reliance on gold reserves, the actions of the Bank of France are difficult to fault . . . [they] conducted policy almost entirely according to the 'rules of the game' because of the stability of the monetary base to international reserve ratio. . . . This is not to claim that French monetary policies were not bad, even disastrous, for the world as a whole: in particular, the large gold inflows induced by the conversion of foreign exchange and the switch by French citizens from deposits to currency put major pressure on other gold standard countries to tighten their monetary policies. However, the damage done by French policies lay to a much greater degree in the government's choice of monetary regime -its commitment to the gold standard, with minimal use of foreign exchange reserves -than in the Bank of France's implementation of that regime."
14 Eichengreen (1986) argues that "France's painful experience with inflation in the early 1920s was directly responsible for the adoption of the stringent regulations which prevented the central bank from intervening to prevent the accumulation of gold." He suggests that "viewing French attitudes in their historical context sheds more light on the actions of policymakers than do allegations of obstinacy or of failure to understand the workings of the international monetary system." Yet, even if it could have pursued a more expansionary policy, French policymakers were not inclined to do anything much differently. Despite the expanding reserve base, the Bank of France did not want to pursue an "inflationary" monetary policy, so it took measures to limit the impact of gold on monetary circulation. They were satisfied with the situation and did not see why any changes should be made. French officials were particularly pleased with the rising cover ratio because it provided a cushion against capital flight. "It would have been extremely imprudent of the Bank to put all its gold to work, even had that been possible," Reynaud (1933, 258-60) argued. "The Bank of France has the duty to be forearmed against the possibility of a sudden withdrawal of foreign funds. . . . It is the duty of the Bank of France to guard against this danger by maintaining, not a sterile gold reserve, but a margin of available credit, so that it may intervene at an opportune moment and so far as possible modify the effect produced by the withdrawal of foreign capital." insisted that the gold inflow demonstrated market confidence in its good policies, that they had done nothing deliberate to increase the gold inflow, and that there was nothing that they could do 15 Reynaud (1933, 260 ) also tried to cast French policy in a favorable light in comparison to the Federal Reserve: "Unlike the United States, the Bank of France has never tried to neutralize the influx of gold into France. It felt that such a policy, by maintaining artificial credit conditions, would actually have stimulated the import of gold and aggravated the monetary difficulties of other countries." to stop it (Mouré 2002 , 183-86, Boyce 1987 . They put the burden on Britain to raise interest rates further if they wished to attract gold.
The French explanation failed to satisfy the British Treasury. As Ralph Hawtrey put it:
"We complain of the drain of gold because it tends to cause a monetary contraction here and in the rest of the world, and Monsieur Escallier's reply is that we can prevent the drain of gold if we choose to effect a monetary contraction!" (Mouré 1991, 63 ). France's refusal to make any concessions infuriated many in Britain. Financial journalist Paul Einzig (1931, vii) vehemently denounced French policy, arguing that it is "the French gold-hoarding policy which brought about the slump in commodity prices, which in turn was the main cause of the economic depression; that it is the unwillingness of France to cooperate with other nations which has aggravated the depression into a violent crisis; and that her unwillingness to co-operate is still the principal obstacle to an economic recovery." 
The Beginning of Deflation
In the mid-to late-1920s, wholesale prices were stable in most countries and the world economy was doing reasonably well. While there were the usual difficulties with reparations 16 Einzig contended that the gold reserves gave France political power that it could exploit; indeed, French officials made threats at various points to sell some of its foreign exchange holdings of certain countries to induce them to agree to French foreign policy objectives, although there is less evidence that such threats were used. Mouré (2002, 191) finds that "Bank of France records reveal no direct political motives at work; such motives seemed obvious, however, to critics seeking to explain the gold flow to France in 1930, and would be evident in central bank efforts to deal with the financial crises of 1931." and the like, there was no obvious indication that the world could not muddle through -until, as The key assumption will be that the two countries fix their cover ratio -the ratio of gold reserves to domestic liabilities (notes in circulation and demand deposits) -at their 1928 levels in subsequent years. Letting G stand for the gold reserves and L for domestic liabilities, the reserve ratio "r" for the 1928 benchmark can be calculated as r 28 = G 28 /L 28 , as depicted in Figure   3 . 
Impact of Gold Hoarding on World Prices
In his 1752 essay "Of Money," David Hume remarked: "If the coin be locked up in chests, it is the same thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated." This analogy seems to apply to the American and French accumulation of gold during this period. To determine the worldwide deflationary impact of U.S. and French monetary policies in the late 1920s requires a simple empirical framework that relates world prices to the underlying stock of monetary gold. Cassel (1928) , Kitchen (1930) , and Warren and Pearson (1933, 80-81) all discussed how world commodity prices were influenced by changes in the world gold stock. All emphasized the same conclusion: the world monetary stock of gold would have to increase about 3 percent per year to maintain stable world prices; if the monetary stock rose at a slower rate, prices would fall; if the stock rose at a more rapid rate, prices would rise. This three-percent factor reflected growing transactions and other demand for gold holding. These economists showed this empirical regularity with an abundance of charts and tables (no regression analysis, of course) that depicted the world gold stock and a measure of world commodity prices dating back to the 1840s. The most frequently used measure of world prices was the Sauerbeck-Statist index, a longest available series of world commodity prices that dated back well into the early nineteenth century.
In this spirit, one approach would be to view the impact of changes in monetary gold reserves on world prices in an equation such as:
where α is the threshold amount of gold needed to ensure rising prices; i.e., if Δ log G t = α then there will be no change in prices. Rearranging this equation leads to the following specification:
(2) Δ log P t = -αβ + β Δ log G t-1 + ε t .
A simple one-year lag specification works well empirically; it turns out that contemporaneous changes in gold reserves are not significantly related to contemporaneous changes in prices.
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Changes in gold reserves might not have an immediate impact on prices because of lags between the appearance of gold in a central bank's reserves and its being monetized to affect prices.
The coefficients of this equation have an economic interpretation. From the constant term, the coefficient α can be recovered. The constant term can be interpreted as the change in the price level if there was no growth in the supply of gold. We would expect the estimate of alpha to be about -0.03, if Cassel and others were correct. The coefficient β gives us the elasticity of the gold stock with respect to commodity prices. Because the coefficient is akin to the money multiplier, we would expect our estimate of beta to be greater than one but less than three. The estimate is related to the reciprocal of the world cover ratio; if the world cover ratio is 0.5, on average, then the gold-money-price multiplier would be about 2.
This specification assumes that G is exogenous, in which prices are completely driven by changes in the supply of gold. Although there is no allowance for the possibility that a lower price level (i.e., a higher relative price of gold) could lead to an increase in production of gold, historical evidence strongly suggests that this is an appropriate assumption. It is commonly accepted that gold production was relatively inelastic in the short-run, i.e., with respect to yearto-year price fluctuations. 20 Yet even over the longer run, Rockoff (1984) and Eichengreen and McLean (1994) find that changes in gold supply prior to 1913 were determined by new discoveries and factors other than the price of gold. Table 3 reports the results from estimating this equation during the period of the classical gold standard from 1870 to 1914. Annual data on the world monetary gold stock and wholesale price index are presented in League of Nations (1930, (82) (83) (84) . 21 The first column indicates that the constant term is -0.04, which when divided by the estimate of β suggests that α equals 0.027.
This finding supports Cassel's contention that the demand for gold was growing at about three percent annually and therefore world gold supplies would need to expand at least that much to maintain the existing level of prices. The coefficient on the change in the gold stock suggests that a 10 percent increase in world gold reserves would increase world prices by 15 percent.
Column 2 estimates the same equation with dummy variables for each decade and finds a much larger coefficient on gold, about 2.7. This is close to a similar estimate reported by Barsky and De Long (1991) , who find a coefficient of 2.47 in a bivariate regression of wholesale price 20 As Sumner (1991, 383) notes: "changes in the supply of monetary gold could only slightly reduce the impact of changes in gold-reserve ratios on the price level, at least in the short-to medium-term."
21 The Sauerbeck-Statist index after 1929 comes from Mitchell (1988) .
inflation (using the Sauerbeck-Statist price index used here) on gold production during the period 1880-1913.
One problem with equation 2 is that it is ad hoc and may be misspecified. Barro (1979) presents a simple model of the gold standard that gives us a more formal framework in which we can interpret the impact of changes in gold supplies on world prices. Under the gold standard, the supply of money is assumed to be a constant multiple of the monetary gold stock:
where M S is the money supply, P G is the nominal price of gold, G is the stock of monetary gold, and λ is a multiplier that relates currency and demand deposits to the value of the monetary gold stock. Money demand is assumed to take the form
where M D is money demand, P is the price level, Y is the level of real output, and k is the ratio of money demand to income. The nominal price of gold -P G -is fixed under the gold standard, and λ is assumed to be constant. This implies the following:
Unfortunately, because of insufficient data any changes in the ratio of money demand to income over time becomes part of the error term. Annual data on world income (real GDP) for Western
Europe and other offshoots (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) come from Angus Maddison's database. 22 Therefore, the empirical specification with the one year lag is:
Column 3 reports that the empirical results are very similar to the previous specification.
The constant term α is estimated to be -0.05 and β is estimated to be 1.54, and both coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent confidence level. When decade dummy variables are included, the coefficient on the lagged gold stock increases to 2.9. The coefficient on gold is slightly lower, at 2.38. As the sample is extended past 1924, the coefficient on gold drops precipitously. This reflects that fact that the changes in world gold reserves were no longer getting translated into world prices and marks the start of the malfunctioning of the interwar gold standard. Table 3 are somewhat uncertain, with one 1.5, another 2.9, and another 2.4. Let us assume that the elasticity of prices with respect to the gold stock is about 2.5. This implies that world prices in 1930 would fall by 16 percent (6.4 X 2.5), other things being equal. In that year, world prices actually fell 17 percent. In 1930, the United States and France increased the amount of gold that they were hoarding by 5 percentage points (11.4 -6.4 Irving Fisher) contributed to bank failures, which in turn led to a reduction in the money multiplier as the currency to deposit ratio increased (Boughton and Wicker 1979) . However, these endogenous responses cannot be considered as independent of the initial deflationary impulse, and therefore U.S. and French policies can be held indirectly responsible for some portion of the remaining part of the price decline.
While the specific conclusion is dependent upon the precise estimate of how much a change in gold reserves affects prices, the general conclusion is not. If the gold-price elasticity is thought to be closer to 1.5, then American and French policies were responsible for about half of the deflation. If the gold-price elasticity is believed to be around 2, then American and French policies were responsible for about two-thirds of the deflation. Whatever the case, the combined impact of American and French policies is very large, regardless of the exact amount, and succeeded in pushing the world into severe deflation.
This calculation can be compared to Sumner (1991) Cassel (1928, 44) argued that "the great problem before us is how to meet the growing scarcity of gold which threatens the world both from increased demand and from diminished supply." While little could be done about the projected slowing growth in the supply of gold, Cassel proposed to remedy the imbalance by restricting the monetary demand for gold: "only if we succeed in doing this can we hope to prevent a permanent fall of the general price level and a prolonged and worldwide depression which would inevitably be connected with such a fall in prices."
Cassel's fears about an insufficient supply of gold were misplaced: as we have seen, the supply of monetary gold continued to expand through the early 1930s. There was no shortage of gold supplies in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but his fears about the increasing monetary demand for gold were entirely realized.
The increase in central bank demand for gold was soon evident. In January 1929, Allyn Young (1929) decried the hoarding of gold by central banks, saying that it was "an expression of financial nationalism" and was "inexplicable on any rationale grounds." He stated that "there is plenty of gold" and that "production and trade can grow without there being a general fall in prices, if only the central banks of the world will permit it." Young concluded:
"No thinking person wants another period of inflation. But the high-gold-reserve-ratio fetish ought not to have the influence which it now has upon banking policies. A gradual downward trend of prices is probable, not because the supply of gold is or will soon become inadequate, but merely because the central banks of different countries will probably try to maintain their separate hoards of gold."
That same month (January 1929), John Maynard Keynes acknowledged that he had been wrong not to take Cassel's pronouncements more seriously. Keynes (1929) warned that "a difficult, and even a dangerous, situation is developing" because "there may not be enough gold in the world to allow all the central banks to feel comfortable at the same time. In this event they will compete to get what gold there iswhich means that each will force his neighbor to tighten credit in self-protection, and that a protracted deflation will restrict the world's economic activity, until, at long last, the working classes of every country have been driven down against their impassioned resistance to a lower money wage."
The recent behavior of the Bank of France "cannot help but cause an artificial shortage of gold," British officials at the League of Nations also tried to raise the issue, but it was so controversial that the multilateral body was unable to address it head on (Clavin and Wessels 2004) . The Gold Delegation issued an interim report in September 1930 that largely sidestepped the main policy issues. However, it did conclude that "the problem of the distribution of gold is thus one of great importance . . . if the distribution of gold is the result of excessive or abnormal competition by a few countries, or if it has the effect of sterilizing important amounts of monetary stocks, serious consequences will arise affecting the general level of prices" (League of Nations 1930, 17) . It noted that the amount of gold cover against notes and sight liabilities is determined by many factors, but that minimum reserves were usually established by national legislation. While no one country could act to reduce its cover ratio, the Delegation suggested that international agreement to reduce cover ratios could alleviate the problem of demand for monetary gold.
In the fall of 1930, Cassel observed that "recent times have been characterized by a relentless struggle for gold rather than by that conscious collaboration, aiming at a limitation of demands, which would have been necessary to stabilize the purchasing power of gold." Cassel stated bluntly what the more diplomatic League of Nations report could not say: that it was "especially remarkable that the Bank of France has consistently and unnecessarily acquired enormous amounts of gold without troubling in the least about the consequences that such a procedure is bound to have on the rest of the world" (Howe 1934, 65) .
In September 1931, after Britain faced mounting losses in gold reserves as a result of the European financial crisis in mid-1931, Keynes argued that the United States and France were "primarily responsible for the disastrous fall in the level of world prices."
"The whole world is heartily sick of the selfishness and folly with which the international gold standard is being worked. Instead of being a means of facilitating international trade, the gold standard has become a curse laid upon the economic life of the world. It is not necessary to go into academic questions as to how far the fall in the world level of prices has been brought about by a worldwide shortage of gold. It is only necessary to look at the present distribution of the world's gold stocks" (JMK 20, 600).
Keynes called for an international gold conference to address the issue:
"This gold conference has to be put forward to America and France as an act of common sense and prudence, as a means of saving the economic world from the disaster which will surely overtake it if the slump is to be prolonged by a universal deflation policy. . . .
We must make it plain to our friends on the gold standard that, if they refuse to play the game according to the rules, this is not to be made a compelling reason for reducing the standard of life in this country for a generation. If, as a result of the conference's failure, we were to leave the gold standard system, this would be preferable to the deflation policy with which the Coalition Government intends to launch this country in the race for economic suicide" (JMK 20, .
In fact, time had run out and Britain left the gold standard just days after Keynes wrote this piece. Keynes (1932, 78, 82-83 ) called Britain's ending of the gold standard a "most blessed event" and said that "the undermining of the competitive position of the export industries of these gold countries will be, in truth, in response to their own request; or, at any rate, a case of States have drawn disproportionate quantities of gold to themselves is certainly very disquieting, but the defense that is offered for this behavior is still more appalling." Cassel (1932, 75) was not optimistic that there would be any change in French policy:
"the great gold accumulation in France is looked upon with so much national satisfaction and pride and, in addition, has actually been used for the exercise of so much political power, that one cannot but get the impression that France will not readily consent to a reduction of her gold holdings, still less do anything in order positively to further a better international distribution of gold."
Ralph Hawtrey (1932, 38 ) also reflected back on this period: "I am inclined therefore to say that while the French absorption of gold in the period from January 1929 to May 1931 was in fact one of the most powerful causes of the world depression, that is only because it was allowed to react to an unnecessary degree upon the monetary policy of other countries."
In the United States, George Warren and Frank Pearson (1933, 125) were pushing a similar line about the problems with the gold standard: "The present depression is not an act of
God for the purification of men's souls. It is not a business cycle. It is not due to extravagant living. It is not due to unsound business practices. It is not due to too great efficiency. It is not due to lack of confidence, but is the cause of lack of confidence. It is due to high demand for gold following a period of low demand for gold. It teaches the devastating effects of deflation, but teaches no other lesson that is good for society."
